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THE ROLES OF MONEY AND CREDIT IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Abstract
This paper considers the implications, for macroeconomic modelling
and for monetary policy, of the interrelationships among money, credit and
nonfinancial economic activity. Data for the United States since World War II
show that the volume of outstanding credit is as closely related to economic
activity as is the stock of money, and moreover that neither money nor credit
is sufficient to account fully for the effect of financial markets in deterinin—
ing real economic activity. Instead' what appears to matter is an interaction
between money and credit. This result is consistent with a macroeconomic
modelling strategy that deals explicitly with both the money market and the
credit market, and with a monetary policy framework based on the joint use
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In thinking about the relationships between nonfinancial economic
activity and quantity measures of what is happening in the financial markets,
most economists and most economic policy makers today focus primarily —if
not exclusively —onmoney. At the theoretical level, the implicit assump-
tion underlying most current macroeconomic analysis is that the money stock
is both necessary and sufficient to represent the relevant information con-
tained in financial quantities. Almost every macroeconomic model, no matter
how simplified, includes the money stock among the variables it represents
explicitly, and few such models include any financial quantities other than
money. At the applied policy level, the formulation of monetary policy
in most of the industrialized Western countries takes place in terms of
target rates of monetary growth. The most prominent exception to the perva-
sive emphasis on money in macroeconomic analysis is that the large macro—
econometric models often do include non—money financial quantities, but
even here such variables are usually only peripheral)
This single-minded devotion to the money stock raises issues that go
beyond mere questions of definition. Any specific monetary aggregate is,
after all, a collection of certain of the public's financial assets.
Although it would strain the meaning of the word "money" to include in it
such items as equity claims and long—term debt instruments, as long as the
focus of analysis is exclusively on the public's assets the question of which
ones to include is, in the end, a matter of definition.2 The more fundamental
issue stems from the underlying reality that any balance sheet has two sides.—2—
Except in the trivial sense that the entirety of the public's assets equals the
entirety of its liabilities plus net worth, the distinction between assets and
liabilities —betweenmoney and credit —isnot definitional. Merely redefining
ways of adding up the various items on the asset side of the public's balance
sheet is not sufficient if there is also valuable information contained in the
liability side.
What accounts for the current preoccupation with money to the exclu—
siori of other financial quantities? Is there something about money that is
"special" in an a priori sense, or is the reason instead an empirical
presumption that, for reasons unexplained, variations in money somehow
correspond more closely to the variations in the nonfinancial aggregates
which are the primary object of macroeconomic inquiry?
Apart from government—issued base money, which is usually not the
definition that people have in mind either in economic analysis or in dis-
cussions of monetary policy,3 there is nothing "special" about money in an
a priori sense. In the simplest abstraction of an economy with no privately
issued financial instruments, base money is the only financial asset, and
there are no liabilities. In modern economies, however, most money is not
base money but bank money, and privately issued financial instruments consti-
tute the great majority of all such instruments issued, held and traded.
For given growth in base money (if that is what the relevant authority does
in fact control), the behavior of the banking system and that of the nonbank
public together determine the growth of both bank money and bank credit,
and do so jointly with the determination of nonbank financial assets and
liabilities as well as nonfinancial economic activity. Economic theory
provides no a priori reason at all to expect a role for the nonbank public's
money holdings but not its credit liabilities.
The reason for emphasizing money in macroeconomic analysis must—3—
instead be a set of presumptions about the empirical relationships connecting
money and the behavior of key measures of nonfinancial economic activity,
including especially income and prices. Indeed, during the last two decades
a vast literature has developed documenting money—income arid money-price
relationships, in a variety of forms corresponding to variations in the
underlying theoretical framework, and for a large number of different coun-
tries and different time periods.
Now more recent work has shown that, at least for the United States
during the period since the 1951 Treasury—Federal Reserve Accord, the rela-
tionship between economic activity and the public's outstanding credit
liabilities exhibits the same degree of regularity and stability as does
the relationship between economic activity and the public's holdings of
money balances. Moreover, still incomplete analysis suggests that the
approximately equal regularity of the credit—income and money—income rela-
tionships holds for other countries as well, including Canada, Germany,
Japan and the United Kingdom.4
The object of this paper is to present the empirical case for a
redirection of emphasis in macroeconomic research, as well as in the formu-
lation of monetary policy, away from the sole focus on money among financial
quantities. The goal is not to show that the money stock contains no infor-
mation that is useful in these two contexts, nor even to suggest that some
non—money quantity dominates the money stock in these contexts and therefore
should replace it as the fulcrum of analysis. The point is simply that
the available empirical evidence does not warrant an exclusive focus on
any one financial quantity. Moreover, if for some reason there is a need
to focus on just one financial quantity, the evidence provides no reason
to conclude that that one should be a monetary aggregate rather than a—4—
creditaggregate.
Section I reviews the evidence documenting the approximately equal
regularity and stability of the relationships between money andincomeand
betweencredit and income in the United States. Merely finding empirical
regularities settles few interesting questions, however. Indeed, it is
difficult to think of a familiar economic hypothesis that is contradicted
merely by the finding of a close relationship between credit and income.
It could always be the case, of course, that the operative chain of causa-
tion ran from money to income and thence from income to credit, so that
the public's decisions with respect to credit liabilities remained a periph-
eral aspect of economic behavior, one which macroeconomic analysis could
safely ignore in the interest of simplification.
Section II examines evidence bearing on the interaction among money,
credit and economic activity, drawn from statistical investigations that are
prior to structural economic model building.5 Here too the results provide
no justification for a special emphasis on money to the exclusion of credit
in macroeconomic analysis. At the same time, the results do go beyond
merely indicating parallel roles for money and credit. Especially in the
context of the determination of real income, what apparently matters is
neither money nor credit alone but rather the interrelationship between them.
Section III goes on to consider what kind of structural economic
model would be consistent with this set of empirical observations. This
line of investigation inevitably leads to the issue of the role of financial
prices (in other words, interest rates), in addition to financial quantities,
in determining nonfinancial economic behavior. Here the evidence indicates
a significant, but still less than complete, connection between the relation-
ship of income to credit documented in Sections I-li and the familiar—5-.
relationship of income to interest rates documented in a precise way in
other recent work. Because the interest rate is the price of credit in
terms of money, this analysis leads naturally to the idea of a three—market
model —includingthe markets for goods and services, for money and for
credit —asan appropriate framework for structural analysis.
SectionIV brings together the major conclusions reached in the
paper and then explores their implications for monetary policy. In the
absenceof evidence supporting a special role for money in macroeconomic
behavior, there is little support for the intermediate target procedure as
currentlyimplemented with monetary aggregates as the sole intermediate
targets. One alternative, of course, would be to abandon intermediate targets
altogether and focus directly on the ultimate nonfinancialobjectives of
monetarypolicy. Alternatively, a two-target framework combining one monetary
aggregateand onecredit aggregate offers some advantages overthecurrent
emphasison monetary aggregates alone, in that it would at least facilitate
the formal incorporation into the monetary policy structure of information
from both sides of the public's balance sheet.—6—
I. The Relative Stability of the Money-Income andCredit-IncomeRelationships
Results based on a variety of methodological approaches consistently
indicatethat the aggregate outstanding indebtedness of all nonfinancial
borrowersin the United States bears as close and as stable a relationship
to U.S. nonfinancial economic activity as do the more familiar asset ag-
gregates like the money stock (however defined) or the monetary base.6
Moreover, in contrast to the familiar asset aggregates, among which there
appears to be little basis for choice from this perspective, total nonfinan-
cial debt appears to be unique in this regard among major liability aggre-
gates.
Figure 1 plots data for 1946—80 showing the yearend credit market
indebtedness, as a percentage of fourth—quarter gross national product, for
the aggregate of all U.S. nonfinancial borrowers and for five different
categories of borrowers that together comprise the total.7 These
data are "net" in the sense that they net out financial intermediation.
For example, the data include such items as a household's mortgage
issued to a bank, or a corporation's bonds sold to an insurance company,
but they exclude any liability issued in turn by the bank or the insurance
company in order to finance that lending activity. The data also exclude
debt issued by separate financial subsidiaries of nonfinancial corporations,
as well as by federally sponsored credit agencies and mortgage pools. The
data are "gross," however, in the sense that they include all of an individual
househo]d or firm's outstanding credit market liabilities, not just any
excess of liabilities over either financial or total assets, and also in
the sense that they include one household's borrowing from another or one
firm's borrowing from another.


















































































































































































































































































































































the top line in the figure, stands out in stark contrast to the variation
of the individual sector components. The nonfinancial economy's reliance
on debt, scaled in relation to economic activity, has shown almost no trend
and but little variation since World War II.After falling from 155.6%
of gross national product in 1946 to 126.6% in 1951 and then rising to
143.9% in 1960, the total has remained within a few percentage points of
that level ever since (the 1980 level was 142.9%).8 Otherwise it has exhibited
a slightcyclicality, typically rising a percentage point or two in reces-
sion years (when gross national product, in the denominator, is weak).
The individual components of this total, however, have varied in
sharply different directions both secularly and cyclically. In brief, the
secular postwar rise in private debt has largely mirrored a substantial
decline (relative to economic activity) in federal government debt, while
bulges in federal debt issuance during recessions have mostly had their
counterpart in the abatement of private borrowing. Households have almost
continually increased their reliance on debt in relation to their nonfinan-
cial activity throughout this period. Both corporations and unincorporated
businesses have also issued steadily more debt, on a relative basis, except
for temporary retrenchments during recession years. State and local govern-
ments steadily increased their relative debt issuing activity during the l950s
and l960s, but just as steadily reduced it during the 1970s. Except only
for 1975—76 and 1980, the federal government has reduced its debt ratio
in every year since 1953, although this relative shrinkage of the federal
debt has been slower in years when recession has temporarily inflated the bud-
get deficit (and, again, depressed gross national product in the denominator).
The first four columns of Table 1 summarize the stability of the


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































groupings, including the "total nonfinancial debt" measure plotted in Figure 1,
andfiveasset groupingsby showing the coefficient of variation (standard
deviationnormalized by mean) for each ratio computed from both annual nd
quarterly U.S. data over the 1953-78 sample period (except for the M3 money
stock, for which data begin only in 1959). In each case the table shows
the coefficient of variation computed from raw data, and also computed from
detrended data.
As columns (1) and (3) of Table 1 show, the comparison for data
including time trends indicates that total net assets and total nonfinancia1
debt are (in that order) the most stable, while the Ml money stock and the
monetary base (in that order) are the least stable, among the ten aggiegates,
Whether or not a particular relationship exhibits a time trend, however,
has little to do with its "stability" in the usual economic sense. The
corresponding comparison for detrended data, shown in columns (2) and (4,
again indicates that total net assets is the most stable aggregate in rela-
tion to gross national product, with toal debt and total nonfinancial
debt, respectively, a close second and third. The monetary base exhibits
the least stability on a detrended basis, with private nonfinancial liabilities
and the Ml money stock close behind. Orderings based on annual data are
essentially the same as those based on quarterly data.
Simple ratios of precisely contemporaneous observations may well
fail to capture the relevant concept of "stability" in the relationship
among variables that move over time with some general lead or lag pattern
between them. The remaining columns of Table 1 present the respective
coefficients of determination and standard errors of ten estimated regre—
sion equations, in each case relating the growth of nominal gross national
product to a moving average of the growth of one of the ten financial—9—
aggregateslistedin the table, plus a moving average of a fiscal policy




where Y is gross national product, F is any of the five liabilityaggregates
or five asset aggregates and E is federal government expenditures calculated
on a high employment basis, all expressed in natural logarithms, andc, the
13. and the y. are scalar coefficients, with the fB. and y. constrained to 1 1 1




Columns(5) and(6)of Table 1 show the results of estimating equations
of the form (1) using quarterly data for the same 1953-78 sample period
used in comparing the simple ratios. Total net assets performs best in this
test, with a standard error of 0.85% per quarter in "explaining" the historical
growth of gross national product, while bank credit (standard error 0.97%)
performs worst. Total nonfinancial debt is about in the middle. Because
there is evidence of a significant break in most of these regressions at
around 1970, however —probably associated with the Federal Reserve System's
change to a monetary target strategy and/or the elimination of the Regulation Q
interest ceiling from large certificates of deposit, both of which occurred
in 1970 columns (7) and (8) also show the respective results for analogous
regression equations based on data for 1970-78 only.9 For this shorter
period the relative performance of total nonfinancial debt is somewhat
better, equalling that of the Ml money stock.
In part because of the extent to which regressions of the form (1)
have been discredited by a variety of criticisms, researchers examining
the money—income (or, here, credit—income) relationship haveincreasingly—10-j
turned to methods that allow for a richer dynamic interaction betweenmoney
and income by relating the variation of income not to theentirety of the
variation of money but only to that part of it which cannot already be de-
duced either from the past history of money itself or from thejoint past
history of both money and income)° In this context a key indication of
the stability of the relationship to income ofany financial aggregate is
the behavior of that relationship following just such an "innovation,"or
unanticipated movement, in the aggregate (or in income). A more general
representation of (1) that is consistent with this interpretation (but
that omits the fiscal variable, so as to keep the order of thesystem small)
is the vector autoregression
Y a BB I p
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where Y and F are again as in (1), the p. are disturbances, the a. are
1 1
fixed scalar coefficients to be dstimated, and the B. .arefixed—coefficient
1J
lag operator polynomials to be estimated.
Solution of the autoregression (2), once it is estimated, yields a
moving—average representation of the form




where the and 0. .arerespectively fixed scalar coefficients and fixed—
i 1J
coefficient lag operator polynomials derived from recursive substitution of
the a. and B. .from(2) to express both Y and F as functions of the current 1 1J
values and past histories of both and p2, and the normalization convention
imposed in estimating (2) constrains the zero-lag elements of the four
polynomials in (3) to =22
=1and 12 =2l0 (so that is "the
Y disturbance" and "the F disturbance"). The orthogonalization of (3)






where the ..andthe E.followfrom the e.. and the p., respectively, and
the s. are now independent.
The upper half of Table 2 summarizes simulations of (4), estimated
in the form (1) using quarterly data for nominal gross national product and
three each of the liability and asset aggregates from Table 1, with eight
quarters of lags on each variable in each equation. For convenience the
table reports the response of F/Y rather than the individual responses of
F and Y separately. Each column in the table presents values, for the initial
quarter and then for the final quarter in each of the first five years,
indicating the time path followed by F/y (for the definition of F indicated)
in response to a 1% innovation in F.
What stands out in these results is the contrast between the time
paths for the three asset aggregate ratios, each of which declines rapidly
albeit irregularly after such an innovation, and those for the three liability
aggregate ratios. The total nonfinancial debt ratio declines rapidly too,
indicating about the same stability in this respect as does any of the asset
aggregates; but both the (narrower) private nonfinancial debt ratio and the
(broader) total debt ratio show pronounced instability, with overshooting
lasting up to three years beyond the initial innovation in F.12
A further aspect of the tendency in recent research to avoid simple
nominal income regressions of the form (1) has been a reluctance to ignore
the distinction between the real and price components of nominal income
variation. The lower half of Table 2 summarizes simulations that are analo-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































average representation solved out from the trivariate vector autoregression
B11 B12 B13 X1
B21 B22 B23 t—l + (5)
B31 B32 333 Ft1 P3
where X is real gross national product and P is the price deflator (both in
natural logarithms). Once again the results show a fairly rapid return
of the F/(X•P) ratio after an innovation in any of the three asset aggre-
gates and also in total nonfinancial debt, but a slower and less stable
return after an innovation in either private nonfinancial debt or total
debt.
among the various liability measures considered, therefore, these
results suggest that there is indeed something unique about total nonfinan-
cial debt. It is as if the Ml money stock ratio were sharply unstable, but
adding commercial bank time and saving deposits to form the M2 money stock
ratio: yielded stability, and further adding thrift institution deposits
to'form the M3 money stock ratio destroyed that stability —noneof which
appears to happen. Hence not only does the total nonfinancial debt ratio
exhibit just as much stability as any of the five asset ratios in these
dynamic tests, it does so uniquely among the various liability aggregates
tested.
In sum, the evidence provided by a variety of methodologies shows
that at least one aggregate measure of outstanding credit liabilities in the
United States —totalnonfinancial debt —consistentlyexhibits just as
much stability in relation to U.S. economic activity as do the more familiar
asset aggregates. Indeed, the debt—to—income relationship measured in this
way can appear to be more stable than any particular money-to—income relation-
ship, depending on the specific measure of money and the specific test used.—13—
Regardless of whether the credit—income relationship is "as stable as"
or "more stable than" that for money, however, like the money—income
relationship it is potentially important for understanding economic behavior.
Nevertheless, although the money-income relationship has long been the
focus of attention, the credit-iicome relationship has to date stimulated
little investigation.—14—
II. Money, Credit, Income and Prices
The mere finding of a regular empirical relationship between the
outstanding debt of nonfinancial borrowers and the economy's nonfinancial
activity is suggestive, but it is not necessarily of direct importance for
either economic model building or economic policy making. For example,
what if the explanation for this observed phenomenon were simply that people
always adjusted their borrowing to stay in line with their incomes, while
their real spending and saving decisions remained predetermined with respect
to their activity in the credit market? The total nonfinancial debt variable
in that case would be interesting from the standpoint of an investigation
of the credit market per se, but there would be little sacrifice to economic
analysis in omitting it from a model primarily intended to deliver insights
into the determination of nonfinancial behavior itself.
Alternatively, what if the observed stability of the credit-to-income
relationship reflected the outcome of a process in which people took decisions
withrespect to their spending and borrowing behavior jointly? Such a process
could emerge ifspendingand saving decisions were sensitive to the expected
yieldlevels that cleared the credit market, for example, or if the credit
market did not clear and people's ability to spend were constrained by their
ability to borrow. In that case a model that failed to account for whatever
joint decision process connected spending behavior and borrowing behavior
would be inadequate, even if understanding the determination of nonfinancial
activity constituted the sole objective of the analysis.
The same arguments apply, of course, to the role in economic analysis
of money (or other asset aggregates). Nevertheless, although few models of macro—
economic behavior include an explicit representation of the credit market, al-
most all include at least a money demand function and an equilibrium condition—15—
for the money market, and many go on to treat the supply of money in some
detail as well. Were it not for evidence like that summarized in Section I,
it would perhaps be possible to rationalize this disparity on empirical
grounds —although,even so, the distinction between making money
an integral or a peripheral part of the analysis would again depend
on whether or not the money market played a role in determining nonfinancial
economic activity.
In light of the evidence summarized above shOwing that there is
little to distinguish the respective stability of the money-incqme and
credit—income relationships on empirical grounds, however, the ration-
alization for including the money market but excluding the credit market in
macroeconomic analysis must hinge on a presumption that money is central to
nonfinancial decisions while credit is not —inother words, that people
jointly determine how much to spend and save and how much money to hold,
but only secondarily determine how much to borrow.
Is there evidence to support this distinction? Just what constitutes
evidence in this context depends in large part on what it means for two
actions to be jointly determined or, alternatively, for one to be predte,-
mined with respect to another. "Causality" is a concept with a precise
meaningin logic (indeed, several precise meanings), but there is little
prospect of using time—series evidence to settle directly questions of
economiccausality)3 "Exogeneity" is a concept with a precise meaning in
econometrics, and time—series evidence is better suited to bear on questions
of econometric exogeneity. In recent years the literature of this subject
has therefore moved away from asserting that one variable "causes" another
to the alternative formulation that the one "is exogenous with respect to"
the other. Even so, as the development of this literature during the past—16—
decade has amply shown,whetherone variable is or is not predetermined with
respect to another, even in the narrower sense of econometric exogeneity,
depends on (among other considerations) what if any third or further variables
the analysis incorporates)4
Perhaps the best way of formulating the question at hand so as to
convey the actual meaning of the tests developed for such purposes by
Granger [9]andSims [18] is to ask whether one variable "incrementally
predicts"or "incrementally explains" another. Because the basis of such
tests consists of regression equations relating one variable to lagged
valuesof another, the issue is really whether the lagged variation of the
right-hand-sidevariable predicts (in beyond-sample analysis) or explains
(in within—sample analysis) the variation of the left—hand—side variable.
The relevant prediction or explanation is not absolute but incremental,
however,in that the lagged values of the specific right-hand—side variable
which is the focus of the inquiry are not the equation's only regressors.
Hence the question these tests address is, more accurately, whether the
lagged values of that specific right—hand-side variable make an incremental
contribution to the equation's predictive or explanatory capacity over and
above that already provided at least by lagged values of the left-hand-side
variable itself and perhaps by lagged values of still other variables as
well.
Put in these terms, one rationale for focusing on the money market but
not the credit market in macroconomic analysis would be a presumption that
money incrementally explains real economic behavior in a way that credit
does not Table 3 summarizes evidence testing this proposition, drawn from
two of the trivariate vector autoregression systems estimated as in (5)






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of the trivariate system consisting of real gross national product, the
price deflator and the Ml money stock (hereafter called simply "money").
The lower half of the table presents analogous statistics for the estimation
of the trivariate system consisting of real gross national product, the price
deflator and total nonfinancial debt (hereafter called simply "credit").
Once again all variables are in natural logarithms, and each of the lag
operator polynomials includes eight quarterly values. For each estimated
equation the table shows the coefficient of multiple determination and the
standard error, and, for each lag operator polynomial, the F-statistic for
the test of the null hypothesis that the polynomial's coefficients are all
equal to zero.
The results presented in Table 3 provide no basis whatever for dis-
tinguishing money from credit along lines that would warrant including the
money market but excluding the credit market in macroeconomic models. The
evidence indicates that neither money nor credit incrementally explains real
income, given the explanatory power already contained in lagged values of
real income and prices. By contrast, both money and credit do incrementally
explain prices, this time given the explanatory power already contained in
lagged values of prices (and of real income, which does not significantly
contribute). Finally, both money and credit are incrementally explained
by real income and by prices, even given the explanatory power of one another
as well as of lagged values of money or credit, respectively.
Hence the evidence does not support the proposition that money hold-
ings and nonfinancial behavior are jointly determined in some sense in
which credit borrowings and nonfinancial behavior are not, nor does it
support the proposition that money is prior to nonfinancial behavior while
credit is not. Indeed, the results reject at the 1% level the proposition—18—
that money is predetermined with respect to either income or prices. By
contrast, a test of the proposition that money is predetermined with respect
to nominal income (that is, that nominal income does not incrementally explain
money), as in Sims [18], would impose on the analysis the constraint that
the respective coefficients of lagged real income and lagged prices must
be identical in the equation explaining money —aconstraint that the dat4
decisively reject.15
Although the finding that real income and prices incrementally explain
both money and credit is not surprising (at least not to this writer),
the apparent absence of any effect of either money or credit on real income
is somewhat surprising. Because prices apparently do incrementally explain
real income (albeit weakly in the second system), while both money and credit
incrementally explain prices, this result is not evidence for any straight-
forward classical neutrality proposition. Even so, it would be surprising
if prices were a sufficient statistic for whatever information financial
quantities conveyed about decisions with respect to real spending, output
and income.
Table 4 helps to resolve this puzzle by presenting statistics, an4o-
gous to those in Table 3, for the estimation of the four-variable vector
autoregression system including both money and credit in addition to real
gross national product and the price deflator. Apart from the expansion to
include all four variables, the system summarized in Table 4 is identical
to those represented by (5) above.
The contrast between the results for the four—variable system and he
corresponding results for the two trivariate systems once again illustrates
that whether or not one variable incrementally explains another depends






























































































































































































































































































































in the direction that a larger information base makes the relevant increment
harder to detect. Although neither money nor credit incrementally explains
real income in the absence of the other, both do so in the presence of one
another. In intuitive terms, what appears to matter for the explanation
of real income is neither money nor credit but, instead, the interrelation
between the two. Moreover, even in the presence of both money and credit,
prices still also incrementally explain real income. Hence the effect on
income represented by the price variable is at least in part independent of
the effect of financial quantities; prices are not a sufficient statistic for
the relevant information contained in financial quantities, nor do money
and credit even jointly constitute a sufficient statistic for the relevant
information contained in prices.
The other results presented in Table 4 are less striking but
interesting nonetheless. Although money and credit each incrementally
explain prices in the absence of the other, neither does so in the presence
of the other (and of lagged prices and real income). Hence money and credit
both apparently convey largely the same information about the determination
of prices, and neither contributes significantly beyond what is contained
in the other. Credit does not incrementally explain money, nor does its
presence overturn the result that both real income and prices do. By contrast
money does incrementally explain credit (although only weakly), and in the
presence of money neither real income nor prices any longer do so.
The results of vector autoregression analysis of real income, prices,
money and credit therefore do not provide any basis for focusing on money
to the exclusion of credit in macroeconomic analysis. From the perspective
of explaining the variation of real income, what appears to be important is
neither money nor credit separately but the relationship between the two. Fromte—20—
perspective of explaining the variation of prices, either one will do, and
thechoice between them is largely arbitrary.16 Finally, the interrelation-
ship between money and credit themselves is apparently not so simple as to
warrant including one and not the other in the analysis. Macroeconomic
analysis should be sufficiently broad to include both the money market
andthe credit market.—21—
III. The Market for Money and the Market for Credit
The conclusion that both the money market and the credit market
should play an integral role in macroeconomic analysis immediately recalls
Patinkin's [15] classic statement of the static neoclassical monetary equili—
brium framework. In its full form this model includes four markets —
thosefor goods and services, labor, money and credit'7 —butby invoking
Walras' Law Patinkin was able to eliminate any one. He chose to eliminate
the labor market and work with the markets for goods and services, money
17 and credit.
Figure 2 illustrates the sense in which the markets for money and
credit are both fundamental in Patinkin's model. The object of the analysis
hereis to determine the price level P and interest rate r —inother words,
the two rates of exchange spanning the three markets. An equilibrium in
(r,P)space is determined by thejoint intersection, asat point E1, of the
three curves representing the market—clearing (r,P) combinations for the
three markets: Xx for the goods and services market, MM for the money
market and CC for the credit market. A change in the underlying conditions
that shifts any of the three curves must also shift at least one of the others.
For example, if the introduction of checkable money market mutual funds
were to reduce people's demand for "money," and therefore shift the market—
clearing curve for the money market from MM to M'M', the logic of the budget
constraints underlying the model's construction dictates that people would
also either increase their demand for goods and services or decrease their
demand for borrowing, or both. If only the demand for goods and services
changed, the XX curve would shift so as to intersect both M'M' and CC at
point E'. If only the demand for borrowing changed, CC would shift so as to in-













curves to a new equilibrium at E2.
Two lines are sufficient to determine a point, of course, so that
even in this framework it still is formally possible to eliminate one of
the three markets. What remains impossible, however, is to determine the
effects of a change affecting any one market without, at the very least,
making a potentially refutable assumption about a corresponding change in
at least one other. In the example of the money market mutual fund, shift-
ing MM to M'M' and leaving XX in place, as is analogous to the practice in
the more conventional Hicks-Keynes IS—LM analysis, is equivalent to assuming
a specific shift in CC. Similarly, analyzing an increase in government
spending that shifts XX to XIX' by leaving MM in place is again equivalent
to assuming a specific shift in CC. In either case, behavior in the credit
market may or may not warrant such an assumption. The results presented
in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that, at least from the perspective of the deter-
mination of real income (though not of prices, as in Patinkin's full employ-
ment model), it is not safe to assume that the credit market passively
absorbs the necessary shifts in this way. Changes in the quantity of money
may or may not have implications for real income, depending on what is
happening to the quantity of credit.
In the context of this three—market representation of economic activity,
the four-variable system summarized in Table 4 uses the quantity of credit
to represent the relevant aspects of behavior in the credit market,
while the remaining three variables represent the quantities in the other
two markets (goods and services and money) and the rate of exchange between
them. To the extent that the objective is simply to include some represen—
tatibn of the credit market, however, the quantity of credit is not the only
logical choice for this purpose. The alternative is either the rate of—23—
exchange between credit and money in a market with nominal bonds, or the
rate of exchange between credit andgoodsin a market with indexed bonds.
Following Mehra's [13] demonstration that including the interest
rate in the analysis is sufficient to reverse Sims' [18] earlier findings that
money incrementally explains income but not vice versa, Sims [19] has estimated
the analog to the system in Table 4 using the rate of exchange between credit
and money —thatis, the nominal interest rate —torepresent the role
of the credit market. Table 5 summarizes the results of estimating a four—
variable system like Sims', but using the same data and details of estimation
as in the work presented above.19 The results are close to Sims', and they
offer some interesting contrasts to those in Table 4. The interest rate
incrementally explains real income, while prices no longer do, nor does
money.2° In the absence of the credit quantity, however,money once again
incrementally explains prices. Real income again incrementally explains
money, but in the presence of the interest rate prices no longer do. Money
does not incrementally explain the interest rate here, although it does
incrementally explain the credit quantity in Table 4.
Beyond the simple distinction between using the quantity variable
and using the relative price variable to represent the third market, is
there any relationship between the two systems summarized in Tables 4 and 5?
Figure 3 shows two alternative representations of the credit market in a linear
stochastic model. In each the intersection of the deterministic parts of
the demand and supply curves —forborrowers and S0 for lenders, respec-
tively —indicatesthe expected equilibrium in (r,C) space. In panel (a)
only the demand curve is stochastic, and the resulting deviations of the
interest rate and credit quantity around expected equilibrium (r0,C0) are


























































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Instability in Credit Supply—24—
stochastic, arid the resulting deviations around (r0,C0) are perfectly negatively
correlated.
Both credit demand and credit supply are presumably stochastic in
reality, so that the actual correlation will be imperfect. The value of the
correlation coefficient constitutes potentially useful information, however.
First, the correlation's sign will indicate whether the dominant source of
stochastic variation in the credit market comes from the behavior of borrowers
or lenders. Second, and more importantly, the correlation's absolute value
will indicate to what extent a univariate representation of the credit market
—eitherthe interest rate or the credit quantity —isadequate. In the
extreme case in which either credit demand or credit supply is nonstochastic,
so that the correlation is perfect, either variable contains all of the rele-
vant information about stochastic shifts in the credit market. At th other
extreme, if credit demand and credit supply are both about equally stochastic
(in independent ways), the two variables contain two separate sets of infor-
mation, both of which are necessary.
Table 6 shows the pairwise correlations between the independent innova-
tions associated with the credit quantity in the orthogonalized moving—average
representation solved out from the four—variable vector autoregression
systemsummarized in Table 4 and the independent innovations associated with
the interest rate in the analogous representation of the system summarized
inTable 5. Table 6 shows correlations between the innovations per Se, as
well as between their respective first differences. In addition, because
the ordering assumed in the orthogonalization in general affects the computa-
tion of the innovations corresponding to particular variables, the table
shows correlations for the innovations computed for credit and the interest
rate ordered last in their respective systems (as in Table 2 above) andTABLE 6
CORRELATIONSBETWEEN CREDIT AND INTEREST RATE INNOVATIONS
Pairwjse Correlations
CE:,E) (AE ,AE ) Cr Cr
C,rordered last .41* .50*
C,r ordered first .27* •39*
Note:E =orthogonalizedinnovation
C =totalnonfinancial debt
r =interestrate on 4—6 month commercial paper
*significantat 1% level—25—
also for these variables ordered first. In each case the interest rate
innovations are lagged one period so that the 4—6 month span of the interest
rateapproximately centers on the corresponding credit quantity observation
(measured as of the end of the quarter).
Thecorrelation between the two innovations is positive regardless
of the details of the computation, indicating that credit demand —that
is, the behavior of borrowers —isthe dominant source of stochastic varia-
tion in the credit market. None of the correlations approaches unity,
however, confirming that credit supply is also importantly subject to
stochastic variation. Hence it is highly unlikely that either the credit
quantity or the interest rate constitutes, by itself, a sufficient represen-
tationof the credit market.
Some representation of thecredit market inmacroeconomicanalysis
isclearly better than none, and the chief contribution of the four—variable
systems presented in Tables 4 and 5 is that each includes one variable
for this purpose: a quantity in the former and a relative price in the
latter. Nevertheless, theevidence presented here suggests not only that
macroeconomic analysis should explicitly incorporate the credit market but
also that it should do so with both a quantity and a relative price variable.
The resulting framework would then be a fully specified three-market model,
including real income, money and credit (the quantities in all three markets)
as well as the price level and the interest rate (the two rates of exchange
spanning them)
20—26—
IV. Implicationsfor Monetary Policy
The evidence presented in this paper supports three conclusions about
the respective roles of money and credit in macroeconomic analysis:
First, the relationship between credit and nonfinancial economic
activity is just as regular and stable as is that between money and economic
activity. The evidence does not warrant including the money market but
excluding the credit market on grounds of the closeness, or lack thereof,
of the observed empirical relationships.
Second, real income and prices are not predetermined with respect to
credit, any more so than they are with respect to money. The evidence does
not warrant excluding either the credit market or the money market on grounds
of being only peripheral to the determination of nonfinancial economic activity.
Third, the interest rate and the quantity of credit both represent
aspects of behavior in the credit market that matter for nonfinancial
economic activity. The evidence suggests, however, that neither variable
alone is adequate to convey all of the information about the credit market
that is relevant to macroeconomic analysis.
These conclusions also bear parallel implications for the choice of
framework for conducting monetary policy. The same evidence that rejects
the propositions which, if true, would rationalize a special role for money
over credit in analysis also rejects the corollary propositions which, if true,
would rationalize a special role for money over credit in the design and
execution of monetary policy. Hence this evidence suggests that there is
little basis for the conventional monetary policy procedures currently in
practice in the United States, as well as in most other industrialized Western
economies, which revolve around specific target rates of growth for some
measure(s) of the money stock with minimal attention paid to credit measures.—27—
Onewayto read the evidence developed in this paper is simply as
further support for the case against having any kind of intermediate target
for monetary policy at all. Under the intermediate target procedure, the central
bank first determines for some financial quantity a time path believed to be
consistent with achieving its ultimate objectives for the nonfinancial economy,
andthenacts as if its objective were to control that quantity so that its
subsequent growth follows the chosen path to within a predetermined range of
tolerance. Hence the intermediate target, which is observable on a timely
basis in the financial markets, stands as a proxy for the ultimate nonfinancial
objectives of monetary policy in a world characterized by uncertainty and
lags of several kinds. In practice, central banks using the intermediate
target procedure have typically chosen a measure of the money stock as the
intermediate target, and the main impetus for the adoption of this procedure
has usually rested at least in part on notions of the special relationship
between money and nonfinancial economic activity.
In fact, the intermediate target procedure would constitute an optimal
way to conduct monetary policy only under extremely stringent conditions
describing the relationship between the intermediate target and the nonfinancial
objectives of monetary policy.22 Even in the context of a simple macroeconomic
model, for example, the intermediate target procedure based on the money stock
as the intermediate target is optimal only if the demand for money is both
perfectly stable and perfectly insensitive to interest rates.
In the wake of the widely publicized collapse of previously well
accepted U.S. money demand functions during the l970s, further evidence that
the demand for money does not meet these conditions is hardly necessary.
Even so, the evidence presented in this paper further strengthens the case—28—
against the intermediate target procedure by indicating the complexity of
the relationship among money, credit and economic activity. Indeed, the
evidence shows that there is no more empirical justification for using money
as the intermediate target than there is for using credit as the intermediate
target. To the extent that arguments for this way of conducting monetary
policy have traditionally rested on the presumption that money plays a special
role, and hence that money should serve as the intermediate target, this
evidence casts further doubt on the appropriateness of the entire intermediate
target procedure.
Even within the more limited context of the intermediate target
procedure itself, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that at the
very least a two-target framework based on one monetary aggregate target and
one credit aggregate target would be superior to a framework based on monetary
targets only, in the usual sense of delivering a greater likelihood of
achieving outcomes for key nonfinancial variables falling within any given
tolerance around corresponding set objectives.(The evidence even provides
some ground for believing that a three-target policy, including an interest
rate in addition to money and credit, would be superior still.)
How would monetary policy function in an explicit two-target money—
and—credit framework? Only with infinitesimal probability, of course, would
the stated target for money and the stated target for credit ever turn out
to be precisely compatible. The diversion between the two aggregates in an
environment of uncertainty would indeed present a problem if the central
bank were to interpret the intermediate target procedure in a strict sense.
If, however, it instead regarded each intermediate target as an "information
variable" which identified a limited set of incoming information to which
there would be a presumption that the central bank would respond as a matter—29—
of course, there would be neither analytical nor practical difficulty in having
two such targets instead of one.2 Indeed, according to the published policy
records of the Federal Open Market Committee, as well as reports to the Congress
by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, monetary policy in the United
States currently uses just such a two—target framework, but with the Mi—B and
M2 money stocks serving as the two targets.
The key advantage of an explicit two—target framework based on money
and credit in comparison to a two—target framework based on two separate
definitions of the money stock, however, would be the incorporation of a more
diverse information base in the set of signals that presumptively matter
for monetary policy. Money is, after all, an asset held by the public, and
each monetary aggregate is just a different way of adding up the public's
assets. The conthination of an Mi—B and an M2 target therefore relies solely
on the asset side of the public's balance sheet, although it aggregates those
assets in two separate ways. A framework based on a money target and a credit
target would instead establish a presumption that the central bank would
respond to signals from both sides of the public's balance sheet, and the
evidence presented here indicates that both sides of the balance sheet do
contain information that is relevant to the determination of nonfinancial
economic activity.
In sum, the evidence presentd in this paper provides no support for
the intermediate target procedure for monetary policy, as currently implemented
with some measure(s) of the money stock used as the only intermediate target(s).
The evidence is instead consistent with either abandoning the intermediate
target procedure altogether and addressing monetary policy directly to its
nonfinancial objectives, or else adopting a two—target monetary policy frame-
work based on both money and credit.Footnotes
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1. An exception in this regard is the role of the quantity of home mort-
gage lending in determining residential construction (and hence the
level of income generally) in the MIT—Penn-SSRC model; see de Leeuw
and Gramlich [41.
2.Indeed, one strand of literature seeks to define "money" simply as
that asset aggregate which bears the closest empirical relationship
to economic activity.
3. An exception is the work of Brunner andMeltzer,who have always
emphasized the role of the monetary base; see, for example, [3 1.
4.I refer here to my own current research, which will be the basis of a
forthcoming paper encompassing all four of these countries, as well
as to work by Islam [11] on Germany and Japan.
5. The concept of these analyses' being prior to structural model building
is in the sense of Zellner and Palm [22] and Sargent [16].Itis not
to be confused with the proposition that such analyses are a substitute
for structural model building.
6. This section draws heavily on my earlier papers [6 ,7 1; seeespecially
[6 ]forthe full set of results.
7. In part because of the capital export controls that were in effect
during 1964—74, foreign obligors have accounted for only a small fraction
of borrowing in U.S. markets throughout this period. Including foreign
borrowers would makelittledifference to the analysis that follows.
8. With the exception of the depression years and (less so) World War II,
the stability in fact goes back at least to 1921 when the ratio stood
at 141.9%; see again [6].
9. Apart from the equation for M3, which is based on a shorter sample
period because of limited data availability, the F-statistic for a
break at 1970 is significant at the 10% level for all of these equations
and at the 5% level for all but two (total debt andtotalnet assets).
10. Among the most important criticisms of the St. Louis approach have
been those of Goldfeld and Blinder [8 1,Sargent[171, and Modigliafli
and Ando[14].The methodology underlying the tests described below










for A =cov(j,p2)/var(p1). This orthogonalization is equivalent to
placing F las in the pairwise causal ordering of Y and F. The alter-
native ordering placing F first, which follows from transposing the
A (or —A) and the zero elements, gives results that are close to those
reported below; see [6 1.
12. 7nalogous simulations for the M3 money stock, net financial assets
and non-federal debt all support this contrast. Bank credit also
appears to be stable, however.
13. See, for example, Tobin [20] and Zeliner [21].
14. The contrast between the results of Sims [18] and the results of Mehra [131
and Sims [19], discussed below, is a striking example of this phenomenon.
15. The F—statistic for this additional constraint is 2.22, which is
significant at the 5% level. Moreover, results for the bivariate
system which does impose this constraint also reject at the 1% level
(F-statistic 2.89) the proposition that nominal income does not incremen-
tally explain money.
16. Only at the 1% significance level is it true that money incrementally
explains prices while credit does not.
17. Patinkin referred to all debt instruments as "bonds" and, for simplicity,
assumed that they were perpetuities. In reality the instruments included
in the total nonfinancial debt aggregate span the entire maturity
spectrum but, at least for the United states, do not include perpetuities.
What actually matters for the pricing of debt instruments is not stated
maturity anyway but the duration (see, for example, Hopewell and
Kaufman [10]) which is always shorter for coupon-bearing instruments,
especially after allowance for the probability of call (see Bodie and
Friedman [2]).
18. The choice of the labor market was perhaps appropriate for Patinkin's
equilibrium analysis, but, as subsequent work (Barro and Grossman [1 :i,
for example) has shown, the labor market is apparently central to
disequilibrium analysis.
19. Sims usedmonthlydata, industrial production instead of real gross
national product, and the wholesale price index instead of the gross
national product deflator.20. The finding that the nominal interest rate renders the price variable
insignificanteverywhere except in the price equation is not surprising
since, with an eight—quarter lag, the F—test for prices is hard to dis—
tinguish from an F-test for the inflation rate.
21. A forthcoming paper will report my analysis of such a five-variable
system.
22. See Friedman [5).
23.See Kareken et al. [121 and Friedman [5] for the development of the
"information variable" concept in the context of intermediate targets
for monetary policy.References
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